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Abstract
Compensation/responsibility theory requires that di¤erences in individual outcomes which can
be fully attributed to di¤erences in underlying compensation factors should be eliminated, while
di¤erences in outcomes caused by di¤erential responsibilityfactors should be preserved. To implement
the theory, a sharpcut between compensation and responsibility factors has to be made, which is
often di¢ cult in practice. In this note, we introduce a more exible soft cut based on a notion
of partial compensation/responsibility into a rst-best income tax model à la Bossert (1995) and
Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996). Two results emerge. First, we show that this softcut does not allow
to escape the Bossert-Fleurbaey separability requirement of the gross income function. Second, we
characterize a partial sharing rule-cum-separability as a natural candidate for partial redistribution.
1 Motivation
Welfarism welfare in society is measured via an increasing function of subjective individual utilities is
the standard way in economics to assess, improve and optimize public policy. However, there are di¤erent
reasons why using subjective utilities is objectionable. In A Theory of Justice,Rawls (1971) criticizes the
welfarist approach and argues in favour of equalizing an objective index of primary goods. In the aftermath
of Rawlswork, many alternative theories of distributive justice were developed in Dworkin (1981a,b), Sen
(1985), Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989), Roemer (1998), and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2010). These new
theories have the following selective-egalitarian viewpoint in common: equality is desirable, but only for
di¤erences in outcomes which are due to a selection of the underlying factors, the so-called compensation
factors; di¤erences in outcomes due to the remaining responsibilityfactors should be preserved.
To implement selective egalitarianism, a sharpcut between compensation and responsibility factors
has to be made.1 Some factors, however, are neither pure compensation, nor pure responsibility factors.
For example, education is a relevant factor for many outcomes, e.g., think of earnings, but it is usually
considered to be inuenced, among other things, by inborn talents (for which individuals cannot be held
responsible), and exerted study e¤ort (for which individuals are responsible). Unfortunately, these two
underlying factors are not observed in practice and we are stuck with an observable factor, education,
which cannot be unambiguously classied as either pure compensation or pure responsibility factor. In
addition to the previous practical problem, opinion survey research shows that a softcut based on the
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1
idea of partial compensation/responsibility is closer to the opinions on distributive justice in di¤erent
countries; see Schokkaert and Devooght (2003). These opinions could arise due to, e.g., a genuine belief in
partial compensation/responsibility or because of second-best considerations.
In this note, we introduce partial compensation/responsibility in a rst-best income tax framework à
la Bossert (1995) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996).2 Although income is the relevant outcome here, the
model can also be applied to other outcomes like health expenditures (Schokkaert and Van de Voorde,
2004) and educational outcomes (Ooghe and Schokkaert, 2009). Gross income is modelled as a function
of di¤erent factors which are partitioned into compensationgroups, i.e., subsets of factors with the same
degree of compensation. The core axiom is partial compensation: di¤erences in gross incomes which are
only due to di¤erences in factors belonging to one and the same compensation group should be partially
reected in di¤erences in net incomes, depending on the degree of compensation for this group of factors.
Two special cases arise. A compensation degree equal to zero implies no compensation and the existing
gross income di¤erences will be fully reected in net income di¤erences; A compensation degree equal to
one leads to full compensation and results in equal net incomes.
We provide two main results. First, the introduction of a soft cut based on the idea of partial
compensation/responsibility does not allow to escape the Bossert-Fleurbaey separability result. More
precisely, partial compensation requires the gross income function to be additively separable between the
di¤erent compensation groups. Whether this is problematic or not is ultimately an empirical question. In
case additive separability ts the data reasonably well, a simple partial sharing rule emerges as a natural
candidate for partial redistribution. As a second result, we dene and characterize this partial sharing
rule-cum-additive separability based on three simple properties: budget balance (the sum of taxes must
be equal to zero), equal treatment of equals (two individuals with the same type should receive the same
net income), and partial solidarity (a multi-prole version of partial compensation).
2 Notation
Let I be a set of individuals with a cardinality denoted by I and let J be a set of factors with cardinality
J . Each individual i in I is fully described by a type, i.e., a vector xi 2 RJ . The gross income of an
individual is a function of his type, formally, gi = G (xi). The government wants to change the gross
income distribution in society to obtain a more desirable net income scheme N . Such a net income scheme
maps the type prole x = (xi)i2I 2 D  RIJ into a vector of net incomes N (x); we use ni = Ni (x) to
denote the net income of individual i. The di¤erence between gross and net income is the tax (or subsidy,
if negative), we use ti = gi   ni, or, if confusion is possible, Ti (x) = G (xi) Ni (x).
Up to now, we follow the framework introduced in Bossert (1995) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996).
Rather than partitioning the set of factors into either compensation or responsibility factors, we generalize
the model here to allow for di¤erent groups of factors, each with a di¤erent degree of compensation. The
social planner partitions the set of factors J into P di¤erent subsets denoted J1; J2; : : : ; JP such that all
factors with the same degree of compensation end up in the same compensationgroup. We gather these
degrees of compensation in a vector  =
 
1; 2; : : : ; P
 2 RP , with k 6= ` if k 6= `. As we will see
2 In a companion paper, we introduce second-best considerations; see Ooghe and Peichl (2010).
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later on, this includes, but is not restricted to the special cases of no compensation (full responsibility)
if k = 0 and full compensation (no responsibility) if k = 1. For ease of exposition, we decompose the
type of an individual as xi =
 
x1i ; x
2
i ; : : : ; x
P
i

, with x`i the subvector of xi corresponding with the factors
in compensation group ` in P  f1; 2; : : : ; Pg. Note that the Bossert-Fleurbaey setting is a special case
with two compensation groups (P = 2), one with full compensation and one with no compensation.
3 Partial compensation and additive separability
We dene and link partial compensation and additive separability of the gross income function. We
start with the core idea of partial compensation. Suppose that the gross income di¤erence between two
individuals can be fully attributed to di¤erences in the factors of one compensation group only. In this
case, partial compensation requires that the di¤erence in taxes paid (or subsidies received) between these
individuals should be proportional to their gross income di¤erence, with the degree of compensation used
as the proportionality factor. Equivalently, the net income di¤erence between these individuals should be
proportional to their gross income di¤erence, now with the degree of responsibility i.e., one minus the
degree of compensation as the proportionality factor.
Partial compensation. For each x in D, for all individuals i; j in I and for each compensation group ` in
P, if xki = xkj , for each k in Pn f`g, then ti  tj = ` (gi   gj), or equivalently, ni nj =
 
1  ` (gi   gj).
If the degree of compensation is zero for a compensation group, then full responsibility applies: both
individuals have to pay the same taxes, or equivalently, the gross income di¤erence is fully reected in the
net income di¤erence. If the degree of compensation equals one, then full compensation applies: the tax
di¤erence reects the gross income di¤erence and as a result, both individuals receive the same net income.
Besides these two special cases, a partial degree of compensation could apply to factors in compensation
group k (if 0 < k < 1), but also undercompensation (k < 0) and overcompensation (k > 1) are
possible.
Additive separability is the requirement that a function dened over types x =
 
x1; x2; : : : ; xP

in RJ
(like the gross income function G) is additively separable in the di¤erent compensation groups.
Additive separability. Consider a partioning of J into di¤erent compensation groups J1; J2; : : : ; JP
and recall that a type x 2 RJ can be decomposed as x =  x1; x2; : : : ; xP . A function F : RJ ! R :
x 7! F (x) is called additively separable (over the di¤erent compensation groups) if there exist functions
F 1; F 2; : : : ; FP such that F (x) =
P
k2P F
k
 
xk

for each x =
 
x1; x2; : : : ; xP
 2 RJ .
Proposition 1 tells us that partial compensation requires the gross income function to be additively sepa-
rable over the di¤erent compensation groups.3
Proposition 1. Let I  4. If a net income scheme N : D ! RI : x 7! N (x) satises partial
compensation then the gross income function G must satisfy additive separability.
Proof . See appendix. 
3 It is also possible to dene the axiom of partial compensation on the basis of income ratios, rather than income di¤erences.
A simple way to do this, is to replace all incomes and taxes in the current version of the axiom by its natural logarithm.
This multiplicative version of partial compensation would lead to multiplicative separability of the gross income function.
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4 A partial sharing rule
Whether the gross income function is additively separable, is ultimately an empirical question. The answer
will depend on the data and on the chosen partitioning of the set of factors. If additive separability ts the
data reasonably well, the following partial sharing rule is a natural candidate for partial redistribution.
Partial sharing rule. Consider a partioning of J into di¤erent compensation groups J1; J2; : : : ; JP ,
and let  =
 
1; 2; : : : ; P
 2 RP collect the degrees of compensation for each compensation group, with
k 6= ` if k 6= `. Suppose G is additively separable over the di¤erent compensation groups, i.e., there exist
functions G1; G2; : : : ; GP such that G (x) can be written as
P
k2PG
k
 
xk

for each x =
 
x1; x2; : : : ; xP

in RJ . The partial sharing rule assigns, for each x in D, a net income
Ni (x) =
1
I
P
i2I
P
k2P 
kGk
 
xki

| {z }
(1)
+
P
k2P
 
1  kGk  xki | {z }
(2)
;
to individual i in I.
The partial sharing rule equally shares those parts of individualsgross incomes for which compensation
applies in (1), and assigns the parts of gross income for which an individual is deemed responsible to
that individual in (2). Note that a partial sharing rule looks like a basic income/di¤erentiated at tax-
proposal, with the shared part (1) as a basic income and the assigned part (2) calculated via di¤erentiated
linear tax rates (equal to the degrees of compensation).
It is easy to verify that the partial sharing rule also satises budget balance (the sum of gross incomes
must be equal to the sum of net incomes) and equal treatment of equals (two individuals with the same
type have to receive the same net income). Formally:4
Budget balance. For each x in D, we have
P
i2I ni =
P
i2I gi.
Equal treatment. For each x in D, for all i; j in I, if xi = xj , then ni = nj .
To obtain a full characterization of the partial sharing rule, however, the previous three axioms (partial
compensation, budget balance and equal treatment of equals) are not su¢ cient. One way to proceed is to
replace partial compensation by partial solidarity. Partial solidarity is similar in spirit, but is concerned
with changes in a prole x. Suppose for example that the `-th solidarity factor of individual j changes from
x`j to x
0`
j , ceteris paribus. Partial solidarity requires that the part of the resulting shock in the gross income
of individual j for which (s)he is not reponsible should be borne equally by all individuals (including j),
while the remaining part should be borne by individual j only.
partial solidarity. For all x;x0 in D, for each j in I and for each ` in P, if xi = x0i for all i in In fjg,
and xkj = x
0k
j , for all k in Pn f`g, then Nj (x0) Nj (x) = Ni (x0) Ni (x) +
 
1  `  G  x0j G (xj) for
each i in In fjg.
Before looking at the joint e¤ect of the last three axioms together, we consider the e¤ect of partial
solidarity in combination with either budget balance or equal treatment of equals. First, partial solidarity
4 It is possible to introduce an exogenous revenue requirement R in the budget constraint. This adds a constant term R=I
to the partial sharing rule.
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combined with budget balance clearly shows how a shock in the gross income of an individual is divided
over the di¤erent individuals.
Lemma 1. Consider a partioning of J into di¤erent compensation groups J1; J2; : : : ; JP , and let  = 
1; 2; : : : ; P
 2 RP collect the degrees of compensation for each compensation group, with k 6= ` if
k 6= `. Consider a net income scheme N : D ! RI : x 7! N (x) that satises partial solidarity and
budget balance. Consider some x;x0 in D, j in I and ` in P such that xi = x0i for all i in In fjg, and
xkj = x
0k
j , for all k in Pn f`g. We have
Ni (x
0) Ni (x) = 
`
I
 
G
 
x0j
 G (xj) , for each i in In fjg , and
Nj (x
0) Nj (x) = 
`
I
 
G
 
x0j
 G (xj)+  1  `  G  x0j G (xj) :
Proof . See appendix. 
Lemma 1 shows more clearly that a part ` of the gross income shock G
 
x0j
  G (xj) is shared equally,
while the remaining part
 
1  `  G  x0j G (xj) is assigned to individual j.
Second, partial solidarity combined with equal treatment of equals implies partial compensation.
Lemma 2. Consider a partioning of J into di¤erent compensation groups J1; J2; : : : ; JP , and let  = 
1; 2; : : : ; P
 2 RP collect the degrees of compensation for each compensation group, with k 6= `
if k 6= `. If a net income scheme N : D ! RI : x 7! N (x) satises partial solidarity and equal
treatment of equals, then it also satises partial compensation.
Proof . See appendix. 
Although partial solidarity is not stronger compared to partial compensation, lemma 2 tells us that it does
provide somewhat more bite if it is combined with equal treatment of equals. This is also reected in our
nal result, which provides a full characterization of the partial sharing rule-cum-additive separability.5
Proposition 2. Let I  4. Consider a partioning of J into di¤erent compensation groups J1; J2; : : : ; JP ,
and let  =
 
1; 2; : : : ; P
 2 RP collect the degrees of compensation for each compensation group, with
k 6= ` if k 6= `. A net income scheme N : D ! RI : x 7! N (x) satises budget balance, equal
treatment of equals, and partial solidarity if and only if
1. the gross income function G satises additive separability, and
2. the net income scheme N is the partial sharing rule.
Proof . See appendix. 
5 Conclusion
We have introduced a more exible softcut based on a notion of partial compensation/responsibility
into a rst-best income tax model à la Bossert (1995) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996). This softcut
does not allow to escape the Bossert-Fleurbaey separability requirement of the gross income function. If
5Proposition 2 also holds for I  2, but, to make the proof short, it is based on proposition 1 (which requires I  4).
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additive separability ts the data reasonably well, we propose and characterize the partial sharing rule-
cum-separability as a natural candidate for partial redistribution. From a theoretical point of view the two
main results generalize some of the results in Bossert (1995) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996). But we
also hope that the introduction of additional exibility will make the compensation/responsibility theory
more attractive for empirical implementation.
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Proof of proposition 1
Let I  4. If a net income scheme N : D! RI : x 7! N (x) satises partial compensation then we must
show that the gross income function G satises additive separability over the di¤erent compensation
groups. Mor precisely, given the partioning of J into di¤erent compensation groups J1; J2; : : : ; JP , there
must exist functions G1; G2; : : : ; GP , one function for each compensation group in P = f1; 2; : : : ; Pg, such
that G (x) =
P
k2PG
k
 
xk

for each x =
 
x1; x2; : : : ; xP
 2 RJ . In case J = 1 or P = 1 the separability
condition is obvious, so we focus on J  2 and 2  P  J in the sequel.
Step 1. Let Jk be the cardinality of Jk. For any two compensation groups k and `, with ` > k, we show
that there must exist functions G `k` : RJ J` ! R and G kk` : RJ Jk ! R such that
G (x) = G `k`
 
x1; : : : ; x` 1; x`+1; : : : ; xP

+G kk`
 
x1; : : : ; xk 1; xk+1; : : : ; xP

for each x 2 RJ . Consider two compensation groups k and ` with ` > k and consider four individuals (1,
2, 3 and 4) with types
x1 =
 
x1; : : : ; xk 1; xk; xk+1; : : : ; x` 1; x`; x`+1; : : : ; xP
  x;
x2 =
 
x1; : : : ; xk 1; xk; xk+1; : : : ; x` 1; b; x`+1; : : : ; xP

;
x3 =
 
x1; : : : ; xk 1; a; xk+1; : : : ; x` 1; x`; x`+1; : : : ; xP

;
x4 =
 
x1; : : : ; xk 1; a; xk+1; : : : ; x` 1; b; x`+1; : : : ; xP

:
for arbitrary vectors x 2 RJ , a 2 RJk and b 2 RJ` . Partial compensation requires
n1   n2 =
 
1  ` (g1   g2) ; (1)
n3   n4 =
 
1  ` (g3   g4) ; (2)
n1   n3 =
 
1  k (g1   g3) ; (3)
n2   n4 =
 
1  k (g2   g4) : (4)
Subtracting (2) from (1) and (4) from (3), and noting that both di¤erences have to be the same, we get: 
1  ` (g1   g2   g3 + g4) =  1  k (g1   g3   g2 + g4) :
Given k 6= ` and g1   g2   g3 + g4 = g1   g3   g2 + g4, this is only possible if g1   g2   g3 + g4 = 0, or
G (x) = G (x2) + (G (x3) G (x4)) ;
for all vectors x 2 RJ , a 2 RJk and b 2 RJ` . Arbitrarily xing a and b we can dene
G `k`
 
x1; : : : ; x` 1; x`+1; : : : ; xP
  G (x2)
 G  x1; : : : ; xk 1; xk; xk+1; : : : ; x` 1; b; x`+1; : : : ; xP 
and
G kk`
 
x1; : : : ; xk 1; xk+1; : : : ; xP
  G (x3) G (x4)
 G  x1; : : : ; xk 1; a; xk+1; : : : ; x` 1; x`; x`+1; : : : ; xP  
G
 
x1; : : : ; xk 1; a; xk+1; : : : ; x` 1; b; x`+1; : : : ; xP

;
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which leads to the desired result.
Step 2. On the basis of step 1, we show that there must exist a list of functions G1; G2; : : : ; GP s.t.
G (x) =
P
k2PG
k
 
xk

for each x =
 
x1; x2; : : : ; xP
 2 RJ .
If P = 2, the representation follows directly from step 1. We proceed by induction. Consider P com-
pensation groups, with 2  P < J , and suppose that the existence of functions G `k` : RJ J` ! R and
G kk` : RJ Jk ! R for any two compensation groups k and `, with k < `  P , such that
G (x) = G `k`
 
x1; : : : ; x` 1; x`+1; : : : ; xP

+G kk`
 
x1; : : : ; xk 1; xk+1; : : : ; xP

(5)
holds for all x 2 RJ , implies additive separability of G (induction hypothesis). We show next that it
also holds for P + 1 groups. Consider a function with P + 1 groups. From step 1 we know that, for each
two compensation groups k and `, with k < `  P + 1, there exist functions G `k` : RJ J` ! R and
G kk` : RJ Jk ! R such that
G (x) = G `k`
 
x1; : : : ; x` 1; x`+1; : : : ; xP+1

+G kk`
 
x1; : : : ; xk 1; xk+1; : : : ; xP+1

for each x 2 RJ . Using these conditions for arbitrary k < `  P , and using the induction hypothesis,
there must exist functions G
k  ; xP+1 for k = 1; : : : ; P , such that
G
 
x1; : : : ; xP ; xP+1

=
PP
k=1G
k  
xk; xP+1

; (6)
for all x1; : : : ; xP ; xP+1. Now, consider an arbitrary compensation group k < P + 1. Step 1 applied to k
and P + 1 gives us a representation
G
 
x1; : : : ; xP ; xP+1

= G kk(P+1)
 
x1; : : : ; xk 1; xk+1; : : : ; xP+1

+G
 (P+1)
k(P+1)
 
x1; : : : ; xP

;
which can be combined with (6) to obtainPP
k=1G
 
xk; xP+1

= G kk(P+1)
 
x1; : : : ; xk 1; xk+1; : : : ; xP+1

+G
 (P+1)
k(P+1)
 
x1; : : : ; xP

or equivalently,
G
 
xk; xP+1

= G kk(P+1)
 
x1; : : : ; xk 1; xk+1; : : : ; xP+1

+G
 (P+1)
k(P+1)
 
x1; : : : ; xP
 P` 6=kG  x`; xP+1 ;
for all x1; : : : ; xP ; xP+1. Fixing all variables, except xk and xP+1, we get a representation of G
 
xk; xP+1

as
G
 
xk; xP+1

= Gk
 
xk

+ eGP+1k  xP+1 ;
with
Gk
 
xk
  G (P+1)k(P+1)  x1; :::; xk 1; xk; xk+1 : : : ; xP  ;eGP+1k  xP+1  G kk(P+1)  x1; : : : ; xk 1; xk+1; : : : ; xP ; xP+1 P` 6=kG  x`; xP+1 :
Since this holds for any compensation group k < P + 1 we can plug it in in equation (6) to obtain the
desired result, i.e., the existence of functions Gk for k = 1; : : : ; P + 1 such that
G
 
x1; : : : ; xP ; xP+1

=
PP+1
k=1 G
k
 
xk

;
for all x1; : : : ; xP ; xP+1, with GP+1
 
xP+1

equal to
PP
k=1
eGP+1k  xP+1.
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Proof of lemma 1
Consider a partioning of all factors J into di¤erent compensation groups J1; J2; : : : ; JP , and let  2 RP
collect the degrees of compensation for each compensation group, with k 6= ` if k 6= `. Consider a net
income scheme N : D ! RI : x 7! N (x) that satises partial solidarity and budget balance.
Consider some x;x0 in D, j in I and ` in P such that xi = x0i for all i in In fjg, and xkj = x0kj , for all k in
Pn f`g. Using partial solidarity, we must have
Ni (x
0) Ni (x) = Nj (x0) Nj (x) 
 
1  `  G  x0j G (xj) ; (7)
for each i in In fjg. Summing both sides of equation (7) over i in In fjg, we getP
i2Infjg (Ni (x
0) Ni (x)) = (I   1)
 
Nj (x
0) Nj (x) 
 
1  `  G  x0j G (xj) : (8)
Adding Nj (x0) Nj (x) to both sides of equation (8), we obtainP
i2I (Ni (x
0) Ni (x)) = I (Nj (x0) Nj (x))  (I   1)
 
1  `  G  x0j G (xj) : (9)
Using budget balance, we can rewrite the left hand side of equation (9) asP
i2I (Ni (x
0) Ni (x)) =
P
i2I (G (x
0
i) G (xi)) = G
 
x0j
 G (xj) . (10)
Combining equation (9) and (10) leads to
Nj (x
0) Nj (x) =
 
1  `  G  x0j G (xj)+ `I  G  x0j G (xj) ; (11)
for individual j, as required. For the other individuals, plug in equation (11) in (7) to obtain
Ni (x
0) Ni (x) = 
`
I
 
G
 
x0j
 G (xj) ,
for each i in In fjg, which completes the proof.
Proof of lemma 2
Consider a partioning of all factors J into di¤erent compensation groups J1; J2; : : : ; JP , and let  2 RP
collect the degrees of compensation for each compensation group, with k 6= ` if k 6= `. Consider a net
income scheme N : D! RI : x 7! N (x) which satises partial solidarity and equal treatment of
equals. We must show that also partial compensation is satised, more precisely, for each x in D, for
all individuals i; j in I and for each compensation group ` in P such that xki = xkj , for each k in Pn f`g is
true, Ni (x)   Nj (x) =
 
1  ` (G (xi) G (xj)) must result by combining partial solidarity and equal
treatment of equals.
Construct a prole x0 with (1) xl = x0l for l in In fjg, and (2) x0j = xi. In words, the transition from x
to x0 is such that individual j becomes a copy of individual i, ceteris paribus. This only requirs a change
from x`j to x
0`
j = x
`
i , while x
k
j = x
0k
j , for all k in Pn f`g. Thus, we can apply partial solidarity, to get
Nj (x
0) Nj (x) = Ni (x0) Ni (x) +
 
1  `  G  x0j G (xj) ; (12)
for i and j. Now, since x0i = x
0
j by construction, equal treatment of equals in prole x
0 requires Ni (x0) =
Nj (x
0). Using Ni (x0) = Nj (x0) and x0j = xi in equation (12) leads to
Ni (x) Nj (x) =
 
1  `  G  x0j G (xj) =  1  ` (G (xi) G (xj)) ;
as required.
10
Proof of proposition 2
Let I  4. Consider a partioning of all factors J into di¤erent compensation groups J1; J2; : : : ; JP , and let
 =
 
1; 2; : : : ; P
 2 RP collect the degrees of compensation for each compensation group, with k 6= `
if k 6= `. A net income scheme N : D! RI : x 7! N (x) satises budget balance, equal treatment
of equals, and partial solidarity if and only if
1. the gross income function G satises additive separability, and
2. the net income scheme N is a partial sharing rule.
It is easy to verify that, given additive separability, the partial sharing rule satises all axioms. We prove
the opposite. In a rst step, we show that additive separability of the gross income function G is implied
by the axioms, while the second step provides us with the partial sharing rule.
Step 1. From lemma 2, we know that partial solidarity and equal treatment of equals imply partial
compensation. Given I  4, proposition 1 tells us that partial compensation implies additive separability,
as required.
Step 2. From step 1 we know that there exist functionsG1; G2; : : : ; GP s.t. G
 
x1; x2; : : : ; xP

=
P
k2PG
k
 
xk

for each
 
x1; x2; : : : ; xP

in RJ . Let the set of individuals be I = f1; 2; : : : ; Ig. Consider an arbitrary prole
x in D together with a sequence of proles which converges to x as follows:
1x = (1x1;1 x2; : : : ;1 xI) = (x1; x1; x1; x1; : : : ; x1; x1)
2x = (2x1;2 x2; : : : ;2 xI) = (x1; x2; x1; x1; : : : ; x1; x1)
3x = (3x1;3 x2; : : : ;3 xI) = (x1; x2; x3; x1; : : : ; x1; x1)
: : :
Ix = (Ix1;I x2; : : : ;I xI) = x:
Using equal treatment of equals, budget balance and step 1, we get
Ni (1x) = G (x1) =
P
k2PG
k
 
xk1

; (13)
for each i in I. Focus on the change from prole 1x to 2x. Using lemma 1 repeatedly, if necessary, since
the type change for individual 2 might involve changes in more than 1 compensation group , we get
Ni (2x) Ni (1x) =
P
k2P
k
I
 
Gk
 
xk2
 Gk  xk1 , for each i in In f2g
N2 (2x) N2 (1x) =
P
k2P
k
I
 
Gk
 
xk2
 Gk  xk1+Pk2P  1  k  Gk  xk2 Gk  xk1 :
Given equation (13), we can rewrite these di¤erences as
N1 (2x) =
P
k2PG
k
 
xk1

+
P
k2P
k
I
 
Gk
 
xk2
 Gk  xk1 ; (14)
N2 (2x) =
P
k2PG
k
 
xk1

+
P
k2P
k
I
 
Gk
 
xk2
 Gk  xk1
+
P
k2P
 
1  k  Gk  xk2 Gk  xk1 ; (15)
Ni (2x) =
P
k2PG
k
 
xk1

+
P
k2P
k
I
 
Gk
 
xk2
 Gk  xk1 , for each i in In f1; 2g : (16)
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Focus now on the change from prole 2x to 3x and again using lemma 1, we get
Ni (3x) Ni (2x) =
P
k2P
k
I
 
Gk
 
xk3
 Gk  xk1 , for each i in In f3g ;
N3 (3x) N3 (2x) =
P
k2P
k
I
 
Gk
 
xk3
 Gk  xk1+Pk2P  1  k  Gk  xk3 Gk  xk1 :
This can be combined with equations (14)-(16) to get
N1 (3x) =
P
k2PG
k
 
xk1

+
P
k2P
k
I
 
Gk
 
xk2
 Gk  xk1+Pk2P kI  Gk  xk3 Gk  xk1
=
P
k2PG
k
 
xk1

+
P3
j=1
P
k2P
k
I
 
Gk
 
xkj
  3Pk2P kI  Gk  xk1 ;
N2 (3x) =
P
k2PG
k
 
xk1

+
P3
j=1
P
k2P
k
I
 
Gk
 
xkj
  3Pk2P kI  Gk  xk1
+
P
k2P
 
1  k  Gk  xk2 Gk  xk1 ;
N3 (3x) =
P
k2PG
k
 
xk1

+
P3
j=1
P
k2P
k
I
 
Gk
 
xkj
  3Pk2P kI  Gk  xk1
+
P
k2P
 
1  k  Gk  xk3 Gk  xk1 ;
Ni (3x) =
P
k2PG
k
 
xk1

+
P3
j=1
P
k2P
k
I
 
Gk
 
xkj
  3Pk2P kI  Gk  xk1 , for each i in In f1; 2; 3g ;
Proceeding in this way we end up at Ix = x with
N1 (Ix) =
P
k2PG
k
 
xk1

+
PI
j=1
P
k2P
k
I
 
Gk
 
xkj
  IPk2P kI  Gk  xk1 ;
Ni (Ix) =
P
k2PG
k
 
xk1

+
PI
j=1
P
k2P
k
I
 
Gk
 
xkj
  IPk2P kI  Gk  xk1
+
P
k2P
 
1  k  Gk  xki  Gk  xk1 , for i in In f1g .
This can be rewritten to obtain
Ni (Ix) = Ni (x) =
P
k2P
 
1  kGk  xki +PIj=1Pk2P kI  Gk  xkj  ; for each i in I;
which completes the proof.
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